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and that he will not sit down with any representatives of the VC, despite announcements from our President that he wishes a political settlement of the war, without any conditions.

It seems evident that thousands more men of our Armed Forces, perhaps 50,000 or 100,000 more, will be committed to fight this American war in South Vietnam. Prime Minister Ky loudmouthed in addition—and that must have embarrassed our President—at Guam, that we should invade Cambodia and Laos, blockade Haiphong and fight on to a military victory. How long will our President stand for him? Ky's "friendly forces" do nothing much except desert each month by the thousands. The South Vietnamese Army of Prime Minister Ky has waged no offensive whatever in many months. They have failed to hold areas we have cleared. It is evident the people of South Vietnam know that Ky is on the side of the landlords and of the privileged class of South Vietnam. While he is maintained in power by the might of the United States it is evident that the Vietcong will continue to fight for their lives and for their liberty against foreign aggressors. Very definitely our unfortunate position in South Vietnam is that of the French aggressors in 1954 who were trying to regain their lush Indochinese Empire from men and women who had their first taste of freedom following the end of World War II.

If our President had rebuked Ky and denounced his belligerent boasts and had gone ahead with a council of war with our generals and admirals in Guam, then the door might have been opened somewhat, leading to an honorable end to this terrible struggle.

He failed to do that, and it seems evident that what lies ahead is a greater involvement of American youngsters, more loss of priceless American lives, and a prolonged and enlarged and more bloody conflict.

Mr. President, the informative letter from the U.S. Navy captain in Saigon, to which I have referred, contains important and startling comments. I hope that all my colleagues will read the letter.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 666), a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1968 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest the absence of a quorum without losing my right to the floor and that after the quorum has been concluded I be recognized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I realize that we are not involved in any great controversial matter. I have no desire to make it one, but rise only because of a recital in the commitee report at page 5 which deals with the question of the development of an antimissile missile.

Mr. President, I am entirely in accord with the idea of authorizing the expenditure which the committee is authorizing for this purpose. I point out, of course, that as I understand it, the previous authorization has not yet been utilized for the purpose, but, be that as it may, the committee is exercising its discretion, and I have no objection to that.

What brings me to my feet is a declaration of policy by the committee, and I do not say this from any adversary sense, but I cannot subscribe to the policy which the committee outlined. I think it is incumbent upon any of us who feel that way to make it clear that we do not agree, and that in voting for this authorization, we are not adopting the particular policy which the committee expresses as its own.

I hasten to add that it is not unusual for a committee to express its point of view. The Appropriations Committee does so on occasion for whatever effect it may have. But in this particular case, as far as the major policy issue is concerned, I rise by way of a caveat to say that I do not believe the committee expression should be binding on me and, obviously, it is not binding on the Senate.

The real question at issue is that the committee proposes in its judgment to say that they would like negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate the requirement for an antimissile missile. Presumably, the Soviets would halt their activities in this regard as a result of negotiations.

I notice, however, that the committee gives itself an out as to the kind of agreement that would be satisfactory to it by saying: "that fully protects the security interests of the United States."

That would not be just any agreement, but it would be an agreement that in their opinion would "fully" protect the security interests of the United States.

I assume that an agreement of that character would be subject to ratification by the Senate and that that would probably conclude the matter. I will not dwell too much upon that.

I would like to turn attention to the policy issue—when and if to deploy ABM's and the timing thereof. The committee does not believe we should leave the time for negotiations on this matter with the Soviet Union undeterminate.

The committee uses the words, "agreement within a reasonable period."

The committee then says: "the committee strongly believes the United States should begin procurement for deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system," in the event that no agreement is reached within that "reasonable period."

It is well known that there is great argument in the country as to that. Many argue that even if the negotiations do not succeed, it would not be advisable and desirable in strategic terms to deploy an antimissile system, that it would cost much without providing significant additional security.

The committee gives us some choices on pages 4 and 5 of its report as to what they call a "thin" antiballistic missile system with a certain price tag on that and on the various choices as to the more inclusive ones. That question, of course, is left for further decision, but in any case the committee makes it very clear that it is the view of the committee that we should begin procurement within a reasonable period if we cannot reach a satisfactory agreement.

I believe that even if the negotiations do not succeed, I would wish to evaluate the strategic implications involved in such an antiballistic missile system at that time.

The other point that the committee makes—in the same paragraph on page five—is:

> In the view of the committee our negotiations with the Soviet Union should include consideration of the desirability of our deploying a "thin" ABM defense against such threats, or those that might be posed by future nuclear powers.

Mr. President, I very much doubt that it would be a proper element of negotiations with the Soviet Union to indicate the desirability on our part of deploying an antiballistic missile defense system against these other unspecified, but obviously Chinese Communist, threats.

I doubt very much that it would contribute to those negotiations and that it would be desirable or, indeed, appropriate as to the decision we will have to take if the negotiations do not succeed.

Mr. President, for those reasons I state my reservation on the record and I qualify my vote by making it clear that such statement cannot and does not—and, of course, the committee does not purport that it does so—bind the Senate. But I just wish to make it clear that in voting for this authorization, as I will, I am not subscribing to this policy.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. RUSSELL. I did not understand what part of the report the Senator is complaining about. Is the Senator in favor of an agreement that does not protect the security interests of the United States?

Mr. JAVITS. Of course not. I am in favor of an agreement, and in favor of an agreement that protects the security interests of the United States. But I am not in favor of leaving it to the Committee on Armed Services to judge for me whether an agreement arrived at does protect the security interests of the United States.

I am not complaining about anything. I say that this committee has a perfect right to write what it did. The only thing I am guarding myself against is

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the understanding that when I vote for this authorization, I am not voting for the committee policy; I am voting for the authorization. It does not bind me, and it does not bind the Senate.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator from New York well knows that it could not bind the Senate, that any treaty in this area would have to be submitted by the President of the United States to the entire Senate, and that perhaps it would not even be considered by the Committee on Armed Services.

It is not unusual for a committee to express its views on these matters. I notice that some of the most voluminous reports we have are from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which goes into the most minute detail on what it expects to be done. I do not feel bound by every statement in such reports.

Unless there is a question of legal interpretation in the courts, the committee's views in the reports are obiter.

Frankly, I do not see anything that is so drastic in these recommendations. The President has said that he wants to have these negotiations, and he asked for this money to go into this bill. The committee did not originate this appropriation this year—the President did, because he wished to have these negotiations.

I do not see anything that is drastic in just expressing the view that even if we have an agreement with the Soviet Union, we should not lose sight of the fact that Communist China is now a nuclear power; and I am sure the Senator from New York would not want us to close our eyes to that fact.

Mr. JAVITS. I have called the attention of the Senate to that fact, and I have spoken about it and have cast many votes on the strength of it, and will do so again.

All I am attempting to do is this: I know that this is a hot issue in the Defense Department, and it is a very hot issue in the country. Therefore, to leave this statement in the report, without anybody saying anything about it, might conceivably give the implication, by silence, that we all agreed and went along. The vote will be overwhelming, perhaps unanimous—as indeed it deserves to be, from that point of view. I wish to make it clear for myself as to how I interpret what is stated, even after the vote, and to state the obvious, which sometimes has to be stated—that it represents the view of a committee and is not binding on the Senate, even after the vote.

I point out, with all respect to my colleague, the Senator from Georgia, that on occasion he has found himself in the same position in which I find myself, in respect of a report from the Committee on the Judiciary or from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare or some other committee. He wants to be sure that he has divorced himself from that part of it. Sometimes the Senator might speak, sometimes he might not.

In this particular case, because it is a matter of great public interest, I am of the opinion that I should make my own view clear. I find no fault whatever, and I believe if the Senator will read my remarks—I am sure he listened to them carefully——

Mr. RUSSELL. I returned to the Chamber while the Senator from New York was speaking.

Mr. JAVITS. I said that I find no fault. The committee has every right to do as it has. I am making clear my own position and my understanding that this does not bind the Senate.

Mr. RUSSELL. Any Senator has a right to express his views contrary to anything that may appear in a committee report.

I think this report is not greatly in conflict with the general line that the President expressed in his message, when he said that he asked for this money but has no intention of spending it if he can agree with the Soviet Union on a policy with respect to the construction of antimissile systems.

Mr. JAVITS. I understand that, and I was taking it one step further, pointing out that even if he did not arrive at any agreement, my understanding is that he still does not have to spend the money; whereas, the committee felt rather strongly that he should.

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, that is true. Of course, I do not think that he will spend it. I doubt very much that they will get a treaty that will protect the interests of the United States. Knowing as I do the high regard for the opinion of the Secretary of Defense that is entertained by the President of the United States, I doubt very much that the President would ever spend a dime, no matter how much is appropriated, unless Mr. McNamara came around to a change of views on his part. The President takes the McNamara line very literally in defense matters.

Mr. JAVITS. I thought there was enough to the McNamara line, without necessarily being 100 percent committed to it, to say what I did.

I thank my colleague.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, may I have the attention of my good friend, the Senator from Georgia, for a moment.

I understand that the $377 million which is in this bill for an antiballistic missile system is not intended for deployment but really for procurement. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I do not think if you put a billion dollars in the bill you could deploy an antiballistic missile system in fiscal year 1968. This is to begin a procurement program that looks to the deployment of an antimissile system.

Mr. CLARK. It is to purchase Spartans and Sprints?

Mr. RUSSELL. This is to purchase the ability to produce an antimissile system.

Mr. CLARK. And no part of this money is intended, in fiscal 1968, to deploy anything?

Mr. RUSSELL. I think that is impossible. I would that we could, because I think the Russians are way ahead of us in this particular area, and I do not think that we are ever going to get an agreement, so long as they have a system and we do not. But I tell the Senator, regretfully, that no system will be deployed in 1968. I wish that it could be.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend, the Senator from Georgia.

I share the views of the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], that I am not in accord with the views expressed by the committee in its report on page 5, where it says, in effect, that if an agreement cannot be concluded within a reasonable period, the committee strongly believes the United States should begin procurement for deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system.

My reasons for agreeing with the Senator from New York and for disagreeing with the Senator from Georgia are as follows:

The Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which subcommittee I am a member and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] is the chairman, has just completed the first phase of hearings on the general question of what the United States should do about the Russian deployment of antiballistic missiles around Moscow and the so-called Tallinn system which may have some antiballistic missile potential elsewhere.

The witnesses we heard included Richard Helms of the CIA; John Foster of the Defense Department; Dr. May and Dr. Bradbury, both of whom are expert in the atomic energy phases of the antiballistic missile question; Cyrus Vance; General Wheeler; and Secretary Rusk.

I came away from these hearings convinced that Secretary McNamara is correct in his judgment that the United should not, at the moment, deploy an antiballistic missile system. Senators will also recall that the Panel chaired by Jerome Wiesner on Arms Control and Disarmament at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, which was held in November and December a year ago, came to the same conclusion.

Since Kosygin has now agreed to discuss the limitation of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and since it is quite clear that the present Russian systems are quite incapable of repulsing anything save the most primitive missile attack on Moscow or any other Russian installation, I believe the joint judgment of Secretaries McNamara, Rusk and the President is correct.

The fact of the matter is that our own Nike X is also vulnerable to a missile attack if the strength the Russians could bring to bear on it, no matter where our defenses are located.

Therefore, I cannot agree with the statement made by a very distinguished American expert in the field of disarmament that it is fatuous for us to imagine that the Russian system is not appreciably effective. On the contrary, the intelligence experts whom we heard in subcommittee were unanimously of the view that we could destroy Moscow or any other Russian installation tomorrow despite the antiballistic missile systems they have deployed.

Nor do I agree that we simply do not know what the Soviets have accomplished. The witnesses we heard were all of the view that we know quite well the capability of the Russian antiballistic missile system. While I am not a scientist, the simple explanations they gave us as to why this is so were quite convincing to me.

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While we do not know for certain what the Tallinn system really is, it is certainly no more effective than the Moscow system and, more likely than that, is intended primarily to defend against high-flying aircraft carrying missiles rather than being an antiballistic missile system.

The difficulty with our deploying the "thin" system is that it would be ineffective against anything other than a very primitive missile attack and would commit us to another extremely expensive round of escalation of the cold war.

Nor can I agree that it is important for us to have a "shield as well as a sword," largely because the shield according to the experts is quite ineffective. While it is possible that further research and development will develop a reasonably good antiballistic missile, nothing of the sort could be deployed for a number of years and, even then, would be unlikely to be comprehensive enough to guard the major centers of population against a sophisticated attack with weapons now in the possession of the Soviet Union.

So far as agreement with the Soviet Union is concerned, I suggest there is a real possibility, in connection with the non-proliferation treaty, of some turn downward in offensive nuclear capability coupled with an agreement not to further deploy antiballistic missiles. Some of the neutrals are, in my judgment, unlikely to sign a nonproliferation treaty unless there is some concession made by both the U.S.S.R. and the United States toward turning the nuclear arms race downward. Frankly, why should they? I am hopeful that the recent progress made at Geneva and New York can be accelerated in the coming talks between Ambassador Thompson and the Russians in Moscow.

In the meanwhile, I am no more concerned than Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk and the President that we may be creating "an antiballistic missile gap." The offense is still far ahead of the defense in this regard if the experts we have been listening to are to be believed.

As to the reaction of Western Europe if we do not immediately deploy an antiballistic missile system, I do not think the Europeans, who have their own astute scientists, are apt to believe the Soviets have broken through in the defensive missile field while we have not.

Therefore, I do not give much concern to the opinion expressed by some European scientists in this regard. I am very much concerned about the cost of this deployment, but I am more worried about the political and psychological effects of an antiballistic missile system in the United States.

This "thin" system, which has been suggested to protect 25 to 50 cities at a cost of $20 to $40 billion is, in my opinion, unwise and logically deceptive.

It is generally conceded that a "thin" antiballistic missile system would no more protect one of our cities from an all-out Soviet attack than Moscow is presently protected by the Soviet antiballistic system from an all-out American attack.

The offensive capability of the Soviet Union could simply overwhelm our presently available "thin" defense strength. The Soviets could probably build new and more effective missiles faster and cheaper than we could build a really effective antiballistic missile system.

It is incredible to me that such a system could be held to 25 or 50 cities.

Was any Pennsylvania city in the original list of 25 cities? Charleston, S.C., was. I wonder why. Everybody in this Chamber knows why.

[This portion was subsequently deleted on motion.]

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I shall yield at the conclusion of my speech. I regret that I cannot yield at this moment.

[This portion was subsequently deleted on motion.]

Mr. CLARK. Both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia are included in the list of 50 cities. But what do I say to my constituents in Reading, Allentown, Bethlehem, Lancaster, Scranton, Erie, and Harrisburg and the other cities, as to why they must go without protection.

In a democracy the suggestion that we can confine protection to our major cities, letting the rest go without defense, is not politically feasible. Nor am I content to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or even the President, to determine the cities to be protected. Moreover the war psychology which inevitably would be engendered from the installation of antiballistic missiles around our major urban centers and the construction of a comprehensive fallout shelter system that would be necessary to give protection, are results I hate to contemplate.

To me an effort to negotiate a commonsense agreement with the Russians is a far more hopeful course for saving our civilization than embarking on another round of cold war escalation.

My entire argument on the antiballistic missile issue is based on the assumption that, for the foreseeable future, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can devise an antiballistic missile defense capable of protecting either their missile installations and cities or our cities. Furthermore, I believe the United States will acquire enough technical information about antiballistic missile systems from an active antiballistic missile research program to overcome any Soviet antiballistic missile defense. Conversely, I find it hard to understand what we can learn about antiballistic missiles by installing, at great expense, a system in the United States that cannot be tested. I am convinced by the testimony I have just heard that this is so. Accordingly, while I am content to vote money for further research and development, and even long-range procurement, as set forth in the bill, I believe we should not attempt to deploy an ineffective system of antiballistic missiles as a counter to the Russian equally ineffective system. The rewards are too slight, the punishments too great.

The subject requires study, and that is what the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations is trying to give it.

I agree with the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] that we should not take the word alone of the Committee on Armed Services, high though my regard is, not only for every member of that committee, but also for its very distinguished chairman. This is a matter which has vast diplomatic and international relations and political implications, and should not be decided because the Committee on Armed Services agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and disagrees with the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Mr. President, a word was said by my friend, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] about the threat of China.

To me, this comment ignores the most important factor with respect to China; namely, that China has no air force and is not by way of getting an effective air force. Today, our armed bombers coming from Guam or Okinawa, or even Thailand, could obliterate overnight, against any type of antiaircraft missile the Chinese could bring against them, the entire Chinese nuclear installation. Thus, the thought of spending billions of dollars to protect 25 or 50 cities or even to give a thin screened offense—we probably could knock down the first missile but the second, third, and fourth which was shot in there within a short time would come in—is an expenditure which cannot possibly be justified.

Mr. President, I say that I hope very much the Senate will not go on record—and it need not—and I will not ask it to—as endorsing the comment made in the report of the Armed Services Committee to the effect that they strongly believe, under certain circumstances, we should deploy an ABM system.

I am now glad to yield to the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], but I see he has left the floor.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, is the Senator from Pennsylvania making the insinuation in his statement that the reason Charleston was included in the ABM system—if it is to be included—is that the chairman of the House committee is from South Carolina?

Mr. CLARK. I certainly inferred as much. That, however, is not my view——

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President——

Mr. CLARK. Alone. That has been——

Mr. THURMOND. I remind the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania that he is violating the rules of the Senate when he makes such a statement.

Mr. CLARK. I suggest to the Senator from South Carolina that——

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President——

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I refuse to yield further to the Senator from South Carolina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

Mr. CLARK. I refuse to yield further to the Senator from South Carolina. I would be happy to——

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I call the Senator's attention to——

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I do not yield——

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I call the Senator to order for talking

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against a Member of the House of Representatives, under rule XIX.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania, under rule XIX——

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I suggest that rule XIX, section 2, permits the Senator from South Carolina to ask me to take my seat. Does the Senator from South Carolina ask me to take my seat? I address a query to the Senator from South Carolina: Does he request me to take my seat under rule XIX, section 2?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is clear that it is improper for a Member of the Senate to reflect on a Member of the House. The essence of the statement made by the Senator from Pennsylvania was that Charleston was included here because the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Representative RIVERS, is from South Carolina, therefore, it is a violation of the rule.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, since I have yielded the floor, a ruling is unnecessary.

Mr. THURMOND. If he wants to take that weak position and not be a man and take his medicine, well and good, let him go.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Washington withhold for just a minute. The Chair wishes to read from the precedents of the Senate. Jefferson's manual refers to this point with respect to reference to members of different bodies, that there is no particular, specific rule with reference to the other members under the rules of the Senate. It is only a question of propriety or impropriety.

The Chair refers to page 314 of Senate Procedure.

The Senator from Washington is recognized.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would like to get a ruling on this point. Since this is a violation of the rule—did the Chair rule that it was a violation?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No. The Jefferson Manual referring to Members of the House do not apply in the Senate. There is no specific rule with reference to Members of the House. It is only a question of propriety or impropriety under the precedents of the Senate, which does not allow Senators to refer to Members of the House in opprobrious terms or to impute to him unworthy motives.

Mr. THURMOND. My interpretation of the rules heretofore has always been that it was a violation. Is the manual not clear on that point?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Jefferson's Manual is not a part of the Senate rules. I am reading this now as it comes from the Parliamentarian.

Mr. THURMOND. On page 315 it says:

> It is also a violation of the privilege to refer to the individual character or to the acts or conduct of members of that body.

Under that, it would seem that it is held to be out of order for a Senator to make reference to Members of the House.

I would ask the Parliamentarian for a ruling, if the Presiding Officer would call upon the Parliamentarian.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, may I inquire, who has the floor?

Mr. President——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would rule that under Rule 19, section 2, the only penalty is that the Senator take his seat. The Senator has already taken his seat.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has already taken his seat.

Mr. President, I move that all reference to Representative RIVERS, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, by the Senator from Pennsylvania be stricken from the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from South Carolina that all reference to Representative RIVERS, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, be stricken from the RECORD.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington will state it.

Mr. JACKSON. Are we under controlled time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I want to take about 5 minutes to congratulate the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee for his able and discerning handling of this huge Defense procurement authorization bill, which affects the expenditure of more than $20 billion. Senator RUSSELL's thoughtful consideration of the mountains of detail in this bill will be reflected in a better-equipped, more secure America.

Because of my duties serving as chairman of a hearing being conducted by another committee, I was unable to attend the final markup and committee approval of this bill last Thursday. I would like at this time to make certain comments that I would have expressed in that meeting relative to the Navy's proposal for the construction of the fast deployment logistics ship, known as the FDL.

This is a highly specialized, large, high-speed vessel which can store heavy equipment and supplies in a controlled environment for long periods. It is designed to rapidly offload its cargo in ports, or over the beach, if required, to provide support for troops airlifted by the new C–5A aircraft. These ships would be deployed to strategic locations around the globe, providing a quick delivery to crisis points.

The Navy has embarked on a new procurement practice for the FDL with industrial participation in the ship design and a total package contract. Secretary Nitze testified to the Senate Committee:

> This new approach to shipbuilding is, in many ways, a major departure from our past practice, and much effort will be needed to realize its potential advantages.

I regret, Mr. President, that the committee last Thursday elected to delete from the Defense procurement bill the Navy's request for $297 million for seven FDL's and to urge that funds authorized earlier for two such vessels be diverted to other uses.

I would like to point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently endorsed and urged approval of the entire rapid deployment program, and, specifically, the FDL ships. Three members of the Joint Chiefs testified strongly in support of the program in hearings before the House Armed Services Committee last week.

The state of our Nation's shipyards is also a factor that must be given the strongest consideration in our review of this new program, which would call for a marked updating and modernization of the yard that would win this contract.

The U.S. shipbuilding industry compares poorly with many of its counterparts abroad. Tables provided me accent this. Sweden, in a recent 5-year period, trailed the United States in improvement in value added per production worker in all manufacturing by 22 percent. Yet the Swedes, on the same scale, improved their production worker value in shipyards by 52 percent, while the U.S. improvement was only by 21 percent. In U.S shipbuilding, the average man-hours per steel-weight-ton is more than three times that of Japan and more twice that of Sweden. Comparable figures of 1960 showed U.S. man-hours appreciably higher than Sweden and Japan, but the margin was not so great. In other words, Mr. President, U.S. shipbuilding is not only trailing progressive foreign yards, but it is clearly falling further behind as the years go by.

Foreign shipbuilders have increased productivity through series, production facilities, use of block and prefabricated sections, early outfitting and improved planning and scheduling—all elements of the proposed FDL procurement plan.

Short of outright subsidies to United States shipyards, the Navy contends that the way to modernization is to provide contracts involving long series production, thereby encouraging private capital investment to reduce production costs.

The FDL presents such an opportunity, as do the single awards of 17 LSTs and 20 destroyer escorts to individual yards. I am advised that there is a planned award of the total multipurpose Amphibious Assault Ship—LHA—to a single contractor and additional long-term contracts for major fleet escort replacements.

If the established shipbuilding industry is afforded the opportunity to compete to build standardized ships in volume, it can be expected that facilities and methods will be modernized and costs reduced

I am pleased that the Navy recognizes, and is willing to take steps to alleviate, the inadequacy of our nation's shipyards, both private and public. The Navy is presently embarking on a program to completley modernize the Naval Shipyards with a 5-year program costing more than $600 million.

I suggest, Mr. President, that if the House of Representatives acts to retain the Navy's authorization request for the FDL's in the procurement legislation it is considering that this item be retained in the conference of the two bodies.

While the FDL program alone should be carefully weighed as to its desirability, I feel that it must also be considered

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in the context of a failing domestic shipbuilding industry.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I noted with interest that the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], in concluding his remarks, referred to a matter to which I was going to address myself briefly, the so-called FDL shipbuilding program. I note that the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], covered this subject very ably in his prepared statement, under the heading of "Airlift and Sealift." I assume the RECORD will carry that statement exactly as it appears in his prepared statement.

Mr. RUSSELL. I hope and trust it will.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the distinguished Senator for making that clear. I note, however, in the report of the committee, under the heading "FDL's," as shown on pages 5 and 6 of the committee's printed report, there is an even more exhaustive statement of the action and thinking of the committee, and the reasons for it.

I have been particularly interested to note the provision made for this program in former years, the fact that the program was not proceeded with, and other matters set forth in some detail in the committee report.

Unless there be objection, I am going to ask to have printed in the RECORD that part of the committee report appearing on pages 5 and 6, under the heading "FDL's," as a part of my statement at this time. I hope that will be done.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. RUSSELL. I shall be happy to see that done.

There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FDL's

The committee recommends a reduction in the authorization of appropriations for the construction of naval vessels in the amount of $301.1 million. This action reflects the committee's decision to disapprove the construction of a new class of fast deployment logistics ships.

The Department of Defense proposed the procurement over a period of several years of as many as 30 of these ships, which would be deployed throughout the world with heavy combat equipment embarked to facilitate a prompt reaction whenever and wherever there was a decision to commit U.S. forces abroad. In concept, our ground forces would be flown to the trouble spot and the heavy equipment would already be there. The ships would be procured from a single contractor over a period of several years by using the total package procurement technique. The estimated cost of procuring 30 of these ships is more than $1 billion and the cost of operating them over their useful life is approximately $1 billion.

The committee is unconvinced that a program of such cost is justifiable. The ships would be constantly deployed in forward areas. Near a combat zone it would be necessary to provide antisubmarine escorts or antiaircraft protection, or both, for the vessels, thus increasing the costs of the system. Beyond the cost, the committee is concerned about the possible creation of an impression that the United States has assumed the function of policing the world and that it can be thought to be at least considering intervention in any kind of strife or commotion occurring in any of the nations of the world. Moreover, if our involvement in foreign conflicts can be made quicker and easier, there is the temptation to intervene in many situations.

In those locations where the United States is by treaty or other commitment obligated to resist aggression, there are other possibilities for providing the heavy equipment needed by our ground forces. In some of these locations, such as Western Europe, the heavy equipment is pre-positioned on land. The Committee was informed that the C-5A, a new large jet transport now under development, will be capable of carrying 98 percent of the heavy bulky equipment ground forces require for maximum combat effectiveness.

In the shipbuilding program for fiscal year 1966 the Department of Defense sought authorization for the construction of four of these ships. At that time the Committee recommended, and the Congress approved, a reduction of the authorization to two ships and indicated in its report (S. Rept. No. 144, 89th Cong., first sess.) the Committee's doubts about the justification for constructing large numbers of ships that would be limited to the pre-position role. The authorization and appropriations for the two ships in the fiscal year 1966 program have not been used. The Department proposed this year to combine the 1966 funding with the additional amount needed to procure seven of the ships initially. The amount requested for authorization was $233,500,000, of which $55.5 million was intended as a contingent contract cancellation payment if more FDL's were not approved for procurement in future years.

The committee recommends $67.6 million of the unobligated funds for the FDL's in the 1966 program be applied to the construction of other vessels in the 1968 program. Consequently, a reduction of $301.1 million in the Navy's shipbuilding authorization has been made.

Mr. RUSSELL. As the Senator pointed out, Congress did make authorization and appropriation for these ships in fiscal 1966, and the Department of Defense took no steps to proceed.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator for his understanding of this matter. My reason for making the statement is that there is a very great interest in nearly all the large ports where there is shipbuilding, at least on the Atlantic side, in this program. The proposal has been generally discussed. I think the record of the debate should show as much information as is available at this time. That is the reason for my request.

I thank the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] for having mentioned the same subject, because the discussions will show that the committee gave most earnest attention to this subject and will show the reasons for the action it took. I am sure that the action was not easy, because the great ports and shipbuilding cities in the States of the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Washington, and the Senator from Florida, as well as States represented by many other Senators, are immensely interested in this program. This debate will show the whole story in a way that will be helpful to the committee and the entire Congress.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, and by unanimous consent, the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 666), a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1968 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I note that in Foreign Affairs Quarterly for April 1967 there appears an article by a distinguished writer, Mr. J. I. Coffey, on the anti-ballistic-missile debate, the very thing we have been talking about. As I think it will add to the knowledge of our colleagues, I ask unanimous consent to include it in the RECORD as a part of my remarks. By way of description, Mr. Coffey, is a former Army officer, who served in the State and Defense Departments and on the White House staff, and is currently chief of the Office of National Security Studies, Bendix Aerospace Systems Divisions.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE DEBATE

(By J. I. Coffey)

One of the great problems in arms control is that advances in technology, and their application to military programs, tend to invalidate or render meaningless even the soundest arms-control proposals. Twice in the last decade this has occurred, once when the diffusion of nuclear technology and the production of large numbers of nuclear weapons rendered futile any hope of complete nuclear disarmament, and again when the advent of intercontinental missiles made necessary a rethinking of all the proposals for limiting or abolishing strategic strike forces. It may well be that we are about to witness a similar overtaking of current arms-control proposals because of the possibility of deploying highly effective ballistic missile defenses.

Although work on anti-ballistic missiles has been under way for some years, the prospects for their being really effective have in the past seemed relatively small. As Secretary of Defense McNamara and others have indicated, this was due largely to the development of sophisticated penetration aids (chaff, decoys, nose cones whose wakes were not easily identifiable by radar, etc.), so that incoming warheads could not be readily distinguished at the optimum altitudes for engagement by anti-ballistic missiles. Under these circumstances, the cost/effectiveness of such missiles was relatively low, in that an enemy could penetrate missile defenses with comparative ease. Alternatively, he could simply bypass local defenses by striking at undefended targets or by exploding large-yield weapons up-wind from defended ones. To cope with this latter threat, and with the possibility of fallout—or even blast damage—from defending missiles detonated at low altitudes, ballistic missile defenses had to be complemented by shelters capable of protecting against fallout and resistant to blast pressure. All in all, it is understandable that the United States did not deploy anti-ballistic missiles during the early sixties.

However, in the past year or so, a number of developments have called that decision into question. The first of these was the dis-

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covery that long-range interceptors could destroy incoming warheads beyond the atmosphere, before they dropped to altitudes at which current types of penetration aids would be effective in confusing the missile defense radars. Moreover, the extended range of these interceptors meant that fewer anti-missile missiles could protect a larger area, thereby reducing both the number of batteries which would have to be deployed and the cost of a defensive system. Even when combined with terminal defenses around targets of particular importance, new types of ballistic missile defenses appear to be more flexible and less costly than those which were under consideration a year or two ago.

A second relevant development was the detonation by the Chinese of a series of nuclear devices, several of which, according to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "included thermonuclear material," and one of which was mated with a short-range missile. Even though a Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile force may, as Mr. McNamara testified, be seven or eight years off, the prospect of such a forces gives rise to understandable concern. A system of anti-ballistic missiles which intercepted targets beyond the earth's atmosphere ("exo-atmospheric") could certainly reduce damage from attacks by small nuclear powers such as China, as well as degrade second strikes or uncoordinated attacks by larger powers and guard against accidental launchings.

The third development has been an apparent step-up of Soviet activity in anti-ballistic missiles. Although the U.S.S.R. has for some years been working on anti-missile missiles, and has even televised films of missile interceptions, evidence of the actual installation of missile defenses has been both scant and contradictory; thus, while President Johnson, in his State of the Union Message, referred only to the emplacement near Moscow of "a limited anti-missile defense," other sources have spoken of Soviet A.B.M. sites athwart the natural access routes of incoming U.S. missiles, and have described the Soviet program as a nationwide net. Even limited Soviet ballistic missile defenses could, as General Maxwell D. Taylor stated some years ago, have a significant political and psychological impact, while more extensive ones might to some degree erode American strategic superiority.

Anyone concerned with the security of the United States must, therefore, pay close attention to the potentialities of ballistic missile defenses for limiting damage from a nuclear strike, or, in a larger sense, for helping to deter such a strike. However, it is not enough to consider the case in so narrow a context, since national security embraces concerns other than that of damage limitation and may prescribe means of achieving that security other than large and costly expenditures for defense systems. Thus, those deciding whether, how and when to deploy ballistic missile defenses must consider their broad effects, taking into account possible Soviet reaction, the impact on friends and allies of such a decision, and the political and sociological implications of such a move for the United States. They must also consider other means of advancing our interests and security, the impact on the arms race the implications for agreement on further arms-control measures, the possible effect on past agreements such as the nuclear test-ban treaty, and the options open to the United States if it deems these factors important.

II

As previously indicated, technological improvements in ballistic missile defenses make feasible the deployment of a system which could markedly reduce the damage from an attack of a given magnitude. This has led to suggestions for at least the partial or "light" deployment of anti-ballistic missiles as a defense against lesser nuclear powers—and specifically against Communist China. It is argued not only that anti-missile missiles could reduce damage from a Chinese Communist attack, but also that they would render such an attack less likely, thereby enhancing the credibility of the American deterrent and giving the United States greater freedom of action in containing or opposing Chinese Communist expansionism in South and Southeast Asia. It is also maintained that the deployment of ballistic missile defenses may advantageously influence Chinese plans for weapons procurement, and specifically that it may induce the Chinese not to build intercontinental ballistic missiles. A look at both these possibilities is in order.

Broadly speaking, the Chinese Communists have two choices: to attempt to develop a regional deterrent based on light or medium bombers, medium-range or intermediate-range ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles; or to aim at a global deterrent, composed of long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and more advanced submarine-launched missiles. Whether they will, in the long run, follow one or both of these routes is less important than the fact that the current constraints on their resources almost force them into a minimal program; indeed, Secretary McNamara's postulated Chinese I.C.B.M. threat is almost a decade off.

Considering these constraints, the possible uses of Chinese nuclear power, and the political advantages of deploying a visible deterrent as soon as possible, it may well be that the Chinese will forgo for the time being the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles—whether or not the United States installs antiballistic missiles. However, this would not preclude the Chinese from developing a capability to launch small-scale attacks against the United States, which they could do either with conventional delivery vehicles such as small ship-borne or submarine-carried seaplanes, or with more exotic vehicles such as submarines equipped to fire nuclear-tipped torpedoes against port installations and coastal cities. In fact, it is possible that the Chinese may find it advantageous to build submarine-launched missiles rather than intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the first place, they now have submarines, they have fired short-range missiles, and they would find it fairly simple to adapt these, or to build rather crude forms of sea-based missiles. In the second place, a missile submarine force would give them both a regional and an intercontinental capability, at least to the extent of small-scale attacks upon coastal cities. Furthermore, such a force would be less vulnerable to preëmptive attack than either bombers or the kinds of first-generation "soft" I.R.B.M.s and I.C.B.M.s that are likely to be within Chinese capabilities.

Moreover, while fear of Chinese retaliation against the United States may inhibit our freedom of action vis-à-vis Communist China, there are other inhibiting factors, ranging from the possibility of Soviet intervention to concern over the political and psychological consequences of drastic measures—factors which certainly operated prior to the time the Chinese developed nuclear weapons. To these must be added the deterrent effect of a regional Chinese capability, which could enable the Chinese to strike at American bases in East Asia or even to threaten the cities of our Asian allies. While such a regional deterrent may not in itself have the impact of an intercontinental one—especially since it may not suffice to "trigger" a Soviet strategic strike against the United States—it will certainly strengthen the present barriers to U.S. military intervention in Asia.

Entirely aside from the question of whether ballistic missile defenses are necessary to deter Chinese nuclear strikes against the United States, it is also questionable whether they will have the desired impact on the Chinese development of particular weapons systems; they may simply induce the Chinese to emphasize weapons programs with which ballistic missile defenses (and particularly exo-atmospheric defenses) cannot readily cope, weapons such as submarine-launched cruise-type missiles. In any case, as China's technology and industrial capacity grows, so also will the sophistication of its weapons. To counter this, we will probably find it necessary to extend, to deepen and perhaps to improve our anti-ballistic missile system and to build up our air defenses and antisubmarine warfare forces. Thus, whatever the initial form of an A.B.M. system designed for use against Communist China, it will ultimately become either largely ineffective or little different from that required to defend against Soviet forces. In the long run, therefore, ballistic missiles defenses capable of coping with a Chinese attack are likely to increase markedly our capability to limit damage by Soviet strategic forces—a point which the U.S.S.R. is not likely to miss.

This raises immediately the question whether ballistic missile defenses are really needed against the Chinese Communists, who do not now possess, nor are likely to possess in the next decade, a strategic strike force sufficient to constitute a serious threat to the United States. For the Chinese to attack, or to threaten to attack, American cities in the face of our strategic superiority would be the rashest of acts on the part of a people who have been noted for their caution and conservatism in the use of military power.[1] Indeed, it is rather astonishing that the United States, which seems satisfied that its deterrent is effective against the Soviet Union, should be so concerned about its ineffectiveness against a power whose resources are miniscule, whose opportunities for significant gains through limited war are considerably less than those of the Soviet Union, and which, moreover, has shown no signs of undertaking such adventures.

III

Whatever the American decision with respect to deploying anti-ballistic missiles against Communist China, it is obvious that this may not be controlling; even should the United States refrain from building ballistic missile defenses, the U.S.S.R. might do so. In view of the tests they have conducted, the boasts they have made of the capabilities of their anti-missile missiles, and their thinking concerning the role of defenses as a stabilizing influence, it is entirely possible that the Soviets may extend to other areas the missile defense now surrounding Moscow—if indeed they have not already done so. In this case, much will depend upon how we react.

One option of course, would be to do nothing, on the grounds that the strength, the diversity and the sophistication of our strategic strike forces now in being or currently programmed would enable them to overcome Soviet defenses, should the necessity ever arise. Although this may suffice militarily, especially against small-scale missile defenses around a few Soviet cities, it has severe drawbacks in other respects; as an unidentified official of the Johnson Administration is reported to have said, the President "could be crucified politically . . . for sitting on his hands while the Russians provide a defense for their people."[2] And

[1] Mr. McNamara has estimated that the best the Chinese could do, by 1975, would be to inflict six to twelve million fatalities on the United States conversely, a small fraction of the U.S. delivery vehicles surviving a *Soviet* first strike could, if directed against China, kill fifty million Chinese and destroy half of Chinese Communist industry.

[2] *The New York Times,* December 27, 1966, p. 9.

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if the Soviets extended their ballistic missile defenses to the extent that they significantly eroded American strategic delivery capabilities, the pressures to respond with some sort of arms buildup would be almost irresistible.

This could take the form of strengthening strategic strike forces, with the primary aim of insuring, as President Johnson said in his State of the Union Message, "that no nation can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or our allies." A second aim might be to retain the ability to limit damage through counterforce attacks against Soviet missile sites, air bases and other strategic targets. In seeking to achieve these aims, the United States would have, broadly speaking, four choices: to penetrate, to overwhelm, to bypass or to evade Soviet ballistic missile defenses. While any of these options could probably maintain our capacity for "assured destruction," they would obviously have quite different implications for damage-limitation, for possible Soviet reactions and, consequently, for the size and the cost of American strategic strike forces.

It is significant that Mr. McNamara, in response to the apparent acceleration of the Soviet A.B.M. program, has chosen to upgrade American strategic strike forces rather than to expand them. Both the Minuteman III, which replaces an earlier version, and the Poseidon submarine-launched missile, which is a successor to Polaris, can carry numerous penetration aids and/or multiple warheads, which, in Mr. McNamara's judgment, would "increase greatly the overall effectiveness of our Assured Destruction force . . . even if the Moscow-type A.B.M. defense were deployed at other cities as well. . . ." Although the introduction of multiple warheads theoretically increases the number of targets at which the United States could strike, these warheads may seem less threatening to the U.S.S.R. than would comparable increases in the size of our missile forces. And in this instance, as in many others, appearance may be as important as reality.

Had Mr. McNamara's proposal been, instead, to saturate segments of the Soviet defenses through timed salvos of missiles, or to exhaust them through the sheer number of missiles launched, this would probably require not only multiple warheads but also larger missile forces. The same would be true if the objective were to bypass their defenses by striking at more lightly defended targets or launching missiles along paths which would avoid the heaviest concentrations of defensive installations. The consequent expansion of American missile forces which are already three times as big as those of the U.S.S.R., could appear to enhance the U.S. counterforce capability and thus threaten the Soviets' own capacity for deterrence. Their logical response would be to expand their Strategic Rocket Forces, and perhaps to place greater reliance on mobile missiles, thus touching off a further round of increases by the United States, and so on.

Interestingly enough, Mr. McNamara has apparently ruled out the option of evading Soviet ballistic missile defenses, which would have meant relying more heavily on weapons systems, such as bombers and cruise-type missiles, that could not be degraded by Soviet A.B.M.s; in fact, he indicated that "a new highly survivable I.C.B.M. would have a far higher priority than a new manned bomber." Since bombers have little or no intrinsic first-strike counterforce capability, they might pose less of a threat to the Soviet deterrent than would an expansion of missile forces, and might provoke other—or milder—Soviet reactions. For the same reason, however, they might make less of a contribution to damage-limitation than would more or better missiles. In sum, the decision to penetrate any future Soviet A.B.M. system, rather than to overwhelm, evade or bypass it, seems to reflect careful consideration of possible Soviet reactions, as well as of our defense needs.

There is, of course, an alternative to strengthening offensive forces, and that is to build defensive ones—a step recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by some influential members of Congress. Here also there are a number of options, ranging from the installation of anti-missile missiles around I.C.B.M. sites to the full-scale deployment of both area and local ballistic missile defenses designed to protect American cities.

As Mr. McNamara testified, the first option is only one possible way of preserving our "assured destruction" capability in the face of unexpected increases in the size and the effectiveness of Soviet missile and missile-defense forces, and must be compared with other ways of preserving that capability; moreover, it would not reduce damage from a Soviet attack on American cities. A "light" A.B.M. deployment around cities, whatever its political advantages and its utility vis-à-vis Communist China, would be largely ineffective against the U.S.S.R. and, like pregnancy, hard to stop short of full term. And extensive ballistic missile defense, while they could significantly reduce damage from an attack by those Soviet forces now in being or presumably programmed, could not reduce fatalities below several tens of millions—even if we struck first against the U.S.S.R. Should the Soviets choose to augment or upgrade their strategic strike forces, the net result could be, as Secretary of State Rusk pointed out, to reëstablish something approximating the present levels of mutual destruction at a much higher cost to both sides.

In the light of this gloomy prospect, the Administration is seriously trying to persuade the Soviets to limit their ballistic missile defenses—an effort upon which the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Llewellyn Thompson, is reportedly engaged. If he succeeds, then neither the improvements in strategic strike forces which the Department of Defense has programmed nor the partial deployment of anti-missile missiles around I.C.B.M. sites for which it has budgeted may be required—and many of the options previously discussed will seem irrelevant. However, it is doubtful whether even our able and influential Ambassador can persuade the Soviet leaders to accept a freeze on weapons, which would condemn the U.S.S.R. to continuing strategic inferiority. And any short-term moratorium on A.B.M.'s will be really significant only if it is the prelude to a broader program of arms limitation, for otherwise the differing strategic concepts and conflicting strategic objectives of the two countries may impel either or both to procure ballistic missile defenses. Thus, one crucial question is the willingness of the United States to propose (and the Soviet Union to accept) new and far-reaching curbs on strategic armaments, now or in the near future.

IV

The content of any new proposals will depend in part on the importance attached to arms control in general and ballistic missile defenses in particular. From the preceding discussion it would seem that the introduction of anti-ballistic missiles—regardless of who introduces them and for what reasons—is likely to have a significant impact on the current negotiations for arms control. For instance, ballistic missile defenses, by injecting a new factor into strategic calculations and by triggering various responses such as those previously described, would necessitate a complete reorientation of our proposal for a freeze on strategic forces. And, since bombers may take on new importance as a hedge against ballistic missile defenses, the deployment of A.B.M.s would make bomber disarmament, whether total or proportionate, less acceptable and less likely.

In addition, the deployment of ballistic missile defenses could stultify progress toward a nonproliferation agreement. For one thing, the Europeans might view Soviet ballistic missile defenses as further degrading the effectiveness of our deterrent, and hence increasing the likelihood of Soviet pressures against NATO Europe. While a subsequent American deployment might somewhat strengthen belief in the credibility of the deterrent, it might also lead to greater European concern over the likelihood and the imminence of war, and thus to renewed efforts to buttress deterrence through the development of their own ballistic missile defenses or through control over nuclear strike forces. And should both sides deploy anti-ballistic missiles, the Europeans may again be concerned lest Europe become a battleground for the nuclear giants. While all conceivable reactions cannot be discussed here, it seems likely that the deployment of ballistic missile defenses by one or both sides will strengthen the desire of some Europeans to develop national or regional nuclear deterrents and increase their reluctance to sign a nonproliferation agreement.

In the longer run, the impact of ballistic missile defenses on the prospects for arms control may be even greater. At the very least, the requirement for hundreds or thousands of nuclear-tipped anti-missile missiles would militate against further cutbacks in the production of fissionable materials. Furthermore, the desire for greater information concerning warhead effects would make it difficult for either the United States or the Soviet Union to give up the underground testing of nuclear weapons, which, according to some reports, is related to the development of missile defense systems. And at some stage in the expenditure of billions of dollars, one side or the other might feel compelled to try out the operational effectiveness of its long-range antimissile missiles against incoming warheads. Even if these tests took place outside the atmosphere, so that there would be no fallout, they would constitute a clear breach of the present nuclear test ban, as would, of course, operational tests of nuclear-armed terminal defense missiles such as the U.S. Sprint or Hibex. Thus, in time, the procurement of ballistic missile defenses might lead to the abrogation of nullification of the nuclear test ban, as well as the inhibition of further progress toward arms control.

One reason for this is the probable effect on the negotiations themselves. As shown by the Soviet reaction to our intervention in Viet Nam, it is hard to reach agreement on arms control during periods of increased tension, such as would probably follow stepped-up expenditures for defensive and offensive strategic weapons. Moreover, increases in strategic armaments would certainly alienate those powers which are already seeking cutbacks in weapons stockpiles and strategic delivery vehicles as the price of their own adherence to any nonproliferation agreement.

At the very least, therefore, the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles would in all probability lead to a hiatus in arms-control negotiations, while both sides tried out their new weapons, decided on countermeasures to the other's deployment, and reestablished an effective and acceptable strategic balance. It could mean the loss of any chance for an early agreement on a comprehensive test ban and on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, leading to decisions by countries such as Italy or India to proceed with their own nuclear weapons programs. And it could lead to a new arms race with the U.S.S.R., in which, as Mr. McNamara put it, "all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side."

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In considering how the United States might attempt to hedge against these potential consequences, while still assuring its own security and protecting its own interests, a number of possibilities come to mind. The first and foremost, of course, is to seek at least a moratorium on anti-ballistic missiles—as we are doing—perhaps at the price of some change in the present levels of strategic strike forces. Failing this, we might seek agreement with the Soviets on measures to limit the numbers or types of ballistic missile defenses, or both, so that neither side would feel threatened by an open-ended deployment of such defensive weapons. Alternatively, the United States might try to set limits on the numbers or types of offensive weapons which might be added to the arsenals of both sides in response to the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, in order to dampen the impact on the arms race of incremental increases in strategic strike forces. Indeed, we might find it desirable to suggest revisions in our present freeze proposal which would allow the limited introduction of anti-missile missiles, providing corresponding numbers of I.C.B.M.s or I.R.B.M.s were destroyed.

To avoid interminable wrangling over technical details, and to allow for necessary adjustments in postures, such agreements might be tacit rather than formal, could be limited to a fixed number of years, or subject to cancellation for cause upon notice. The important problem is not the design of new measures, but recognition that reduction in armaments may promote the national security as well as—or better than—their augmentation.

It is obvious that judgments as to the desirability of building ballistic missile defenses will differ according to one's opinion as to the likelihood of war, one's desire to employ strategic forces as coercive instruments, one's theories on crisis behavior, and one's views as to how the communists are likely to conduct themselves in the next decade. But whatever views one may have on the utility of A.B.M.s, one must also acknowledge their disadvantages. For any deployment, the price, in coin and in new instabilities, will be high. Chief among the costs is likely to be an erosion of the already slim possibility of reaching agreement on further arms-control measures which could promote a more secure world. Without denying the importance of military power in attaining this goal, it is still possible to question the relative allocation of resources to the increase of that power, and particularly the addition of increments which promise so little and risk so much. On these grounds the whole issue of constructing ballistic missile defenses needs to be carefully thought through, by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there may appear in the RECORD an article which appeared in the Washington Post of Friday, March 17, 1967, entitled "ABM's Start Urged by Chief of A-Weapons," being an article on an interview held with Dr. Harold Agnew, head of the Atomic Energy Commission at Los Alamos.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ABM'S START URGED BY CHIEF OF A-WEAPONS

(By George C. Wilson)

SAN FRANCISCO, March 16.—It is of "crucial importance" for the United States to go ahead immediately with an antimissile defense, the chief of the Government's nuclear weapons laboratory said today.

Dr. Harold Agnew, head of the Atomic Energy Commission's Los Alamos, N.M., Scientific Laboratory Weapons Division, said the first step should be to put the missile defense around U.S. ICBM sites.

Agnew, declaring he was speaking as a private citizen and not for the Laboratory, said failure to produce and deploy the Nike X missile defense now would set the whole program back for "two or three years."

The companies working on the Nike X are ready for the next step but will disband their technical teams and convert their facilities to other uses if the system is kept in suspension again this year.

UNITED FRONT BROKEN

Agnew gave these views in an interview following his appearance on a discussion program at the Air Force's Association convention here. Even though he spoke as a private citizen, his prestige in the nuclear field plus his government post breaks the united front of the Johnson Administration on the anti-missile issue.

President Johnson is trying to negotiate an agreement under which neither the U.S. nor Russia would go forward with missile defenses. Russia already has installed at least a partial missile defense. Agnew said the U.S. should do likewise even while negotiations are going on.

[Following a course outlined by President Johnson, the Senate Armed Services Committee today recommended a start on construction of anti-missile defenses unless an early agreement is reached with the Soviet Union, the Associated Press reported.]

OVER 10-YEAR PERIOD

Agnew said Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's estimate of $40 billion for a full-scale missile defense "is quite cheap insurance" when compared with Vietnam spending. The $40 billion would be spent over ten years.

Agnew ripped into many of the assumptions of McNamara and Dr. Jerome Wiesner about Nike X. Wiesner is a former presidential science adviser who has been a leader in disarmament efforts.

"There was a time when what was good for me militarily was probably by definition bad, or a minus, for the other nations," Agnew said.

"Of late however," he added, "the Defense and State Departments seem to have a new set of conditions: what is good for me should also be good for my adversary and vice versa; as such systems can only be considered good if they contribute to stability."

This refers to McNamara's argument that the United States and Russia would upset the military balance between them if either side built an anti-missile system. McNamara favors relying on an overwhelming offense.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I am ready for the vote.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I firmly support S. 666, which is to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1968 for the procurement of hardware for all branches of the armed services, as well as research, development, test, and evaluation for these items.

The total of the appropriations authorized by this bill is $20,765,332,000. The bulk of these funds, or $13,484,700,000, is for procurement of items urgently needed, such as aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles. The remainder, or $7,280,632,000, is for research, development, test, and evaluation.

In my judgment, this is one of the most important bills to come before the Congress each year, if not the most important. The items authorized to be purchased by this bill are necessary to the immediate survival of our country and the research and development funds authorized are for items which are of equal, or in some cases of paramount, importance to the survival of our country.

One item of particular concern to me, which the Armed Services Committee has included in this bill, is the authorization of funds for preproduction activities directed toward the deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system. As background information, it will be recalled that last year Congress authorized and appropriated $167.9 million for the purchase of items leading to the deployment of an ABM system. Unfortunately, these funds were not obligated and spent by the Department of Defense for the purpose that they were made available by Congress. Again this year, the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, and hopefully the entire membership of the Senate, will take firm action indicating to the world strong support for the immediate procurement of long leadtime items necessary for the deployment of an ABM system. In this bill, the Armed Services Committee is recommending $291 million for the procurement of these long leadtime items. In addition, there is included $86 million for construction and operation and maintenance costs for the ABM system. Thus, the total amount included in this bill is $377 million. Added to the amount made available in fiscal year 1967, the Defense Department will have $544.9 million on hand to go ahead with an ABM deployment.

It is my hope that the Secretary of Defense will not delay any longer a decision to move ahead in this area. The entire Armed Services Committee has taken a very firm stand on this matter, and the discussion of the need to move ahead can be found on page 5 of the Armed Services Committee report on S. 666.

As it is noted in the report, expenditure of the funds made available in this bill for the deployment of an ABM system does not necessitate an immediate decision on the type defense to be ultimately deployed. The decision could later be reached whether we desire to deploy the "thin" defense or a more extensive version. Should the decision be made to deploy the more extensive defense system, there will be the opportunity to provide additional funds necessary in future authorization bills.

Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity to congratulate the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee [Mr. RUSSELL] and the distinguished ranking minority member [Mrs SMITH]. Both have given more than generously of their time and efforts in connection with this entire bill, and particularly the question of an ABM system. Their stanch support for the deployment of an ABM system, which is so vital to the security of our Nation, is to be highly recommended.

I also wish to commend Mr. Darden of the staff of the Armed Services Committee for his efficient work in this matter. I urge that the Senate give its immediate and overwhelming approval to S. 666.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, so that Senators may be informed, I announce that immediately following this vote there will be a vote on the safety-at-sea treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Shall the bill pass? On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE], and the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MCINTYRE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MCINTYRE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON] and the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA] are absent on official business.

The Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY] is necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], and the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 86, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 66 Leg.]

YEAS—86

Aiken	Brewster	Clark
Allott	Brooke	Cooper
Anderson	Burdick	Curtis
Baker	Byrd, W. Va.	Dirksen
Bartlett	Cannon	Dodd
Bennett	Carlson	Dominick
Bible	Case	Ellender
Boggs	Church	Ervin
Fannin	Lausche	Prouty
Fong	Long, Mo.	Proxmire
Fulbright	Mansfield	Randolph
Gore	McCarthy	Russell
Griffin	McClellan	Scott
Hansen	McGee	Smathers
Harris	McGovern	Smith
Hart	Metcalf	Sparkman
Hartke	Miller	Spong
Hatfield	Mondale	Stennis
Hayden	Monroney	Symington
Hickenlooper	Montoya	Talmadge
Hill	Morton	Thurmond
Holland	Moss	Tower
Hollings	Mundt	Tydings
Jackson	Muskie	Williams, N.J.
Javits	Nelson	Williams, Del.
Jordan, Idaho	Pastore	Yarborough
Kennedy, Mass.	Pearson	Young, N. Dak.
Kennedy, N.Y.	Pell	Young, Ohio
Kuchel	Percy	

NAYS—2

Gruening	Morse

NOT VOTING—12

Bayh	Hruska	Magnuson
Byrd, Va.	Inouye	McIntyre
Cotton	Jordan, N.C.	Murphy
Eastland	Long, La.	Ribicoff

So the bill (S. 666) was passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the second time in as many days the senior Senator from Georgia has demonstrated his singularly thorough and profound knowledge of our military structure. In successfully presenting the procurement authorization measure for fiscal 1968, he observed that knowing just how much is enough for defense is a difficult matter. I agree. However, as difficult as it is, it is not beyond the grasp of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. I believe he also has voiced the opinion of the great majority of us in the Senate when he stated that as long as American men are in southeast Asia, they will be given our unstinting support. The authorization for that support is contained partially in the bill just overwhelmingly passed.

To the distinguished ranking minority member of the committee, the gracious and charming senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], go our thanks for ably assisting the passage of this measure. I join with Senator RUSSELL when he praised her earlier today as one of the best informed Senators on all matters concerning the armed services.

The senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is to be commended for offering his strong and sincere views on the measure, as are the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON].

I, personally, am grateful to all Senators for cooperating so selflessly in an effort to dispose of this measure, swiftly and with the utmost efficiency.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the Senate proceeded to consider executive business.

AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous unanimous-consent agreement, the Senate will now proceed to vote on executive E, 90th Congress, first session.

The question is on the adoption of the resolution of ratification. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE], and the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MCINTYRE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MCINTYRE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON] and the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA] are absent on official business.

The Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY] is necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], and the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY] would each vote "yea."

The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 88, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 67 Leg.]

YEAS—88

Aiken	Hansen	Moss
Allott	Harris	Mundt
Anderson	Hart	Muskie
Baker	Hartke	Nelson
Bartlett	Hatfield	Pastore
Bennett	Hayden	Pearson
Bible	Hickenlooper	Pell
Boggs	Hill	Percy
Brewster	Holland	Prouty
Brooke	Hollings	Proxmire
Burdick	Jackson	Randolph
Byrd, W. Va.	Javits	Russell
Cannon	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Carlson	Kennedy, Mass.	Smathers
Case	Kennedy, N.Y.	Smith
Church	Kuchel	Sparkman
Clark	Lausche	Spong
Cooper	Long, Mo.	Stennis
Curtis	Mansfield	Symington
Dirksen	McCarthy	Talmadge
Dodd	McClellan	Thurmond
Dominick	McGee	Tower
Ellender	McGovern	Tydings
Ervin	Metcalf	Williams, N.J.
Fannin	Miller	Williams, Del.
Fong	Mondale	Yarborough
Fulbright	Monroney	Young, N. Dak.
Gore	Montoya	Young, Ohio
Griffin	Morse	
Gruening	Morton	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—12

Bayh	Hruska	Magnuson
Byrd, Va.	Inouye	McIntyre
Cotton	Jordan, N.C.	Murphy
Eastland	Long, La.	Ribicoff

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present and vot-

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ing, having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

Mr. MAGNUSON subsequently said: Mr. President, the action, the action by the Senate today in giving its advice and consent to the amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea is personally gratifying to me as chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce.

The lack of adequate international safety standards for passenger vessels was made apparent by the tragic fire on board the *Yarmouth Castle*. Following the U.S. Coast Guard investigation of that horrible disaster, the Commerce Committee began hearings on the matter of safety of life at sea. We discovered that because of the 1960 Safety of Life Convention, the United States was limited in its ability to protect the American citizen who stepped aboard a passenger vessel of another nation. The basic flaw in the 1960 convention was its provision that vessels in existence at the time of ratification were not required to conform to the new safety standards. Thus, we had a number of vessels sailing the high seas which did not meet modern safety standards.

From the standpoint of our own legislation, the Commerce Committee reported and the Congress passed legislation requiring disclosure to passengers of the safety standard which a particular ship met. This was only a partial solution, however, for the real issue was the upgrading of the international standards.

The United States took the initiative in calling for a special meeting of the Fire Safety Committee of the International Maritime Consultative Organization to negotiate amendments to the 1960 convention. The amendments which the Senate has given its advice and concent to today are the result of that meeting. They will insure, when ratified by two-thirds of the contracting government, that all passenger ships conform to the highest safety standards.

Senator LAUSCHE is to be commended for insuring prompt action by the Foreign Relations Committee on these amendments.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

On request of Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, and by unanimous consent, the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

"TRENDS IN FEDERAL SPENDING—PAST AND FUTURE"—ADDRESS BY SENATOR ELLENDER

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, our distinguished friend the senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] delivered a very fine speech yesterday at Boca Raton, Fla., at the 34th annual conference of the Southeastern Electric Exchange.

I ask unanimous consent that the speech of Senator ELLENDER be included in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TRENDS IN FEDERAL SPENDING—PAST AND FUTURE

(Address by Senator ALLEN J. ELLENDER to the 34th annual conference of the Southeastern Electric Exchange, Boca Raton, Fla., Mar. 20, 1967)

Ladies and Gentlemen: I am delighted to be here today to discuss a few of the spending programs and policies undertaken by our federal government over the years. I am not an economist, but 30 years of my life have been spent in the United States Senate, and since 1949 I have been a member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. As you are aware, this Committee has the task of overseeing and attempting to direct and control all the expenditures of the federal government, and thereby the programs and activities which are undertaken.

I use the term "attempting to direct" or "attempting to control" these expenditures and programs, advisably. Of a total budget for fiscal 1968 of $135 billion, the Congress will have the opportunity to exercise some control over no more than $30 billion. I will discuss this point more fully later on, but for the moment, the figures make it fairly obvious that in the field of federal spending, as in many other areas, Congress has virtually lost the control provided by those who framed our Constitution.

Our Founding Fathers very wisely placed the responsibility for providing revenues and controlling expenditures with the Congress. They went even further, as you are well aware, by stipulating that all revenue measures should originate in the House of Representatives, as that body was the closest to the people. History informs us that our early settlers had considerable experience with taxation without representation, but after 190 years of taxation with representation, I sometimes wonder how much better off we are today.

The Constitution provides:

"The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; . . .

"To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; . .

"To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two years; . . .

"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. . . ."

There is almost no way to over-emphasize the importance that this function now carries for the growth and development of our nation and the daily lives of our citizens.

Budget considerations consume far more Congressional time, study, and attention each year than any other single subject. These considerations sweep across the scope of all our Federal activities. The Appropriations Committee of either House is a strategic assignment for any Member of Congress who desires to work, and to keep abreast of what goes on. I make it a point to attend all meetings of the full Senate Committee, and most of the meetings of the six appropriations subcommittee on which I serve.

Throughout our history, Congress has struggled to devise ways and means of carrying out its Constitutional authority. The effort has been marked by conflicts with the Executive Branch, and within the Halls of the Congress. A series of compromises has resulted in the delegation of a large part of the Congressional control over the budgetary process.

In the Treasury Act of 1789 Congress assigned to the Secretary of the Treasury the responsibility for compiling and reporting "estimates of the public revenue and expenditures," but no authority was granted either to review expenditure estimates or to oversee the use of appropriations.

Subsequently, the Congress enacted many laws in an effort to regulate purchasing, contracting, payment of salaries, transportation, and even to limit the rate at which appropriations could be expended. All of those measures proved ineffective.

In 1820, Congress enacted a law requiring the Secretaries of the Navy and War to submit on February 1, of each year, a statement of their financial needs and the unexpended balances of previous appropriations. In time, similar statements, plus additional data, were required from other agencies of the Federal Government.

Under this process, which had grown piecemeal and unplanned, there was no office responsible for formulating a budgetary program for the entire Government. Estimates submitted to Congress represented the requests of the administrative departments concerned, and there was no coordination or consideration of the relative merit of these requests or of their justification in keeping with the Government's available resources.

In 1909, Congress passed the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act, which made the President responsible for recommending to it the means by which the annual expenditure estimates might be brought within the amount of estimated revenues. Later that year, President Taft conferred at length with his Cabinet officers on the amounts of their respective requests for the year 1910. This was the first direct participation by a President in the preparation of budget estimates.

On June 25, 1910, Congress authorized President Taft to appoint a commission which was later to become known as "the President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency." This turned out to be a milestone in the development of the present budget system. On February 26, 1913, President Taft, in order to demonstrate its usefulness, submitted to the Congress a budget prepared with the aid of his Commission on Economy and Efficiency However, even though this budget reform idea gained a number of supporters, no action was taken until after the end of World War I.

In 1919, Congress passed a budget and accounting bill which provided for a budget system. President Wilson vetoed this bill; he favored the budget system, but he objected on Constitutional grounds to a feature which denied the President the authority to remove the Comptroller General from office. Virtually the same bill was passed by the next Congress and approved by President Harding on June 10, 1921.

Later, that year President Harding submitted to the Congress the first presidential budget, containing estimates of both revenues and expenditures. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 created the Bureau of the Budget and placed it under the direct supervision of the President, even though it remained physically in the Treasury Department. The Budget Bureau was charged with the responsibility for preventing new activities which would result in useless duplication of work and for the general promotion of economy and efficiency in administration.

In 1939, Congress passed the Reorganization Act of 1939 which established the Executive Office of the President and transferred the Budget Bureau to this Office.

The Budget Bureau, acting through the Executive, has since become the most potent force affecting the budget process. It seems to be continually trying to take more and more authority unto itself. The Budget Bureau now has the final say over the estimates presented to the Congress in January of each year. It also has a large degree of control over the expenditure of funds for programs expressly authorized by the Congress, but not recommended by the President. Increasingly, the Budget Bureau seeks to inject itself into the realm of national

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